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Lead Paint:




Consider Paint Co., a hypothetical paint manufacturer, who in the
early 2oth century used lead pigment to manufacture its paint products.
Such was a common industry practice at the time, and Paint Co.'s
competitors did the same. After Paint Co.'s routine production, the paint
was shipped from the plant and sold to consumers. The consumers then
took the paint and applied it to the walls of private residences all across
America.
As decades passed, the paint began to chip off the walls of these
homes, and in many instances would end up in a child's mouth. It was
discovered that lead-based paint could cause serious harm to humans if
ingested. Numerous lawsuits surfaced seeking to hold Paint Co. and its
competitors liable for the harm caused by the lead-based paint, but
plaintiffs could not find a viable theory to hold Paint Co. liable, and the
litigation faded away.
Years later, to Paint Co.'s alarm, the tempered lead paint litigation
that had seemed to all but disappear, flared up once again as government
entities found a new plausible legal theory and began to sue lead paint
manufacturers on behalf of citizens who were harmed by lead-based
paint. The government claimed that the widespread use of lead paint
created a public nuisance, or, in other words, created "an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public"'-the right to
live in a safe and healthy environment. Though this new theory of
liability seemed tenuous at best, the court accepted it and ordered Paint
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Co. to abate the nuisance, or, to follow a particular set of measures to
eliminate the paint and its hazards.
Because the abatement process would be very expensive to the
company, Paint Co. was relieved that it had obtained business liability
insurance. Like almost every manufacturer in the country, Paint Co. had
entered into a contract with a commercial insurer to protect against the
financial consequences of business liability claims. The contract, called a
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy, specified that among other
categories of coverage, the insurer would cover amounts that Paint Co. is
legally obligated to pay as "damages." Paint Co. looked to its insurer for
coverage. But the insurer denied the claim, pointing out that costs of
abating a hazard are not "damages." Paint Co. argued the costs should be
covered. The insurer maintained that they should not.
So what is the ending to Paint Co.'s story? There isn't one yet. Just
like the Paint Co. hypothetical, after nearly two decades of fruitless
efforts to hold former lead paint and lead pigment manufacturers liable
for the damaging effects of widespread use of lead paint in private
residences,2 the first signs of success are blossoming. On February 22,
2006, a Rhode Island jury
render[ed] a verdict determining that: (i) the presence of lead
pigments in paints throughout Rhode Island was a public nuisance; (2)
three former manufacturers, suppliers, and promoters of lead
pigments... were liable for that public nuisance; and (3) the
responsible defendants were required to abate the existing nuisance.3
With various cities, counties and states having already litigated the
same issue,4 and others currently litigating the issue in the wake of Rhode
Island,5 some commentators have referred to this new wave of litigation
as "'the next tobacco' or 'the next asbestos.' 6 While the formerly
"untouchable" lead paint manufacturers may be ordered to abate the
nuisance, the answer to the aforementioned critical question still remains
uncertain: Who will ultimately bear the cost of such abatement? The
manufacturer or its insurer?
2. See Scott A. Smith, Turning Lead into Asbestos and Tobacco: Litigation Alchemy Gone
Wrong, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 119, 119 (2004) (noting that "lead paint and pigment defendants had never
lost or settled a case since the first wave of lawsuits against them began in 1987").
3. Aileen Sprague & Fidelma Fitzpatrick, Getting the Lead Out: How Public Nuisance Law
Protects Rhode Island's Children, ii ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 603, 603-04 (20O6) (citing Jury
Verdict Form, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2oo6) (on file
with The Hastings Law Journal)).
4. Leadlawsuits.com, Understanding Lead Paint Litigation -State by State Breakdown, http://
www.leadlawsuits.com/index.php?s=presskit (last visited June I, 2008) [hereinafter State Breakdown]
(listing Milwaukee, St. Louis, and New Jersey, as some of the cities and states that have already
litigated this issue).
5. See id. (current litigation by city or county found by clicking on links for individual states).
6. Smith, supra note 2, at 120.
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The economic impact to either party would be substantial.
Estimated costs of abatement in Rhode Island alone could soar as high as
$3.74 billion.7 If manufacturers bear the cost, in many instances the
burden will fall on companies that are innocent successors-in-interest of
former lead paint manufacturers.8 If insurers bear the cost, they may be
forced to pay for harm resulting from a risk that was never intended to
be covered in the insurance policy.' While the language of the insurance
contract between an insurer and the insured manufacturer generally
spells out when coverage exists and when it does not, CGL policy
language tends to raise more questions than answers when applied to
public nuisance claims seeking costs of abatement.
Specifically, a CGL policy requires an insurer to provide coverage
for "damages" the insured paint manufacturer becomes legally obligated
to pay.'I The term "damages" generally refers to a legal remedy awarded
by a court, and "[m]oney damages are.., the classic form of legal
relief."" Thus, only when there is a remedy for damages is the insurer
obligated to provide coverage. Abatement, or the physical removal and
elimination of lead paint hazards, however, is an equitable remedy'2 and
will not oblige coverage under a CGL policy because abatement alone
does not fall within the classification of "damages." But where "costs of
abatement" are part of the remedy, it begs the question: Is money
required to be paid by the manufacturer to abate the public nuisance
within the meaning of "damages," or are such payments viewed only as a
necessary element of an equitable abatement remedy?"' Some believe
7. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, LIABILrrY COVERAGE FOR LEAD PAINT CONTAMINATION:
THE RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC NUISANCE LEAD PAINT LITIGATION, ONE YEAR LATER 3 (Feb. 7, 2007),
http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub615.pdf [hereinafter SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
LLP 2007].
8. Smith, supra note 2, at 120 ("Most of the companies sued as former manufacturers of lead
pigment never made the product but are alleged successors-in-interest (even, in some cases, successors
to successors) of companies that once manufactured lead pigment more than half a century ago.").
9. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 955-76 (1988) (discussing the effect of expansive insurance policy coverage of
environmental liabilities).
10. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR LEAD PAINT CONTAMINATION:
INSURANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHODE ISLAND LEAD PAINT PUBLIC NUISANCE VERDICT 5-6 (Mar. 6,
2006), http://www.stblaw.com/content/publications/pub 5 4o.pdf [hereinafter SIMPSON THACHER &
BARTLETT LLP 2oo6].
ii. Position Paper on Abatement Submitted by Defendants Millennium Holdings LLC, NL
Industries, and the Sherwin-Williams Company at 5, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226
(R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Position Paper on Abatement] available at
http://www.leadlawsuits.com/index.php?s=press-kit&cat=14 (click on link to "April 21, 2006 -
Abatement Position Paper") (last visited June I, 20o8).
12. The abatement remedy awarded by a jury has been characterized as an equitable remedy.
Transcript of Record at *I, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2006 WL 691803 (R.I.
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2006).
13. See generally NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 446, 457 (D.N.J
1996) ("The Court of Appeals of New York has not addressed the breadth of the term 'damages' in
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costs of abatement are equitable in nature, 4 others believe they are
clearly legal in nature.'5 Because the decision in the Rhode Island case,
Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Ass'n, is the first of its kind, there are no
reported decisions that give definitive guidance with respect to this
particular issue in the lead paint abatement context.
This and related issues, however, are not entirely novel with the
emergence of recent developments in lead paint litigation.'7 Remedying
public nuisances and abating toxic substances have similarly occurred in
asbestos, tobacco, firearms, and environmental contamination situations.
These particular contexts are similar to the recent lead paint litigation in
that in each a toxic substance or manufactured product was singled out as
the root harm to a significant portion of the public population. Yet,
despite the similarities, none of these other contexts provide an
authoritative solution that analogously applies in determining who bears
the costs of abatement where lead paint creates a public nuisance.
For example, where asbestos is concerned, because the
manufacturer of a material containing asbestos can be readily identified,'"
a product liability theory, and not a public nuisance theory, has been the
path to successful litigation. Thus, the asbestos context sheds no light on
how to treat costs of abatement in a public nuisance context. Similarly,
where tobacco is concerned, successful litigation is not based on a public
nuisance theory,'9 but rather on a product liability theory." Thus, past
tobacco litigation also fails to address the role of insurers under a theory
insurance contracts and whether it includes abatement costs."); SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETr LLP
2006, supra note Io, at 3 (stating that an issue to be addressed is "[w]hether lead paint abatement costs
incurred following a finding of public nuisance are 'damages' within the meaning of comprehensive
general liability insurance contracts").
14. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLET-r LLP 20o6, supra note Io, at 6 ("Abatement costs.., are an
equitable remedy and future expense.").
15. See Mark E. Miller, Lead-Based Paint Insurance Coverage: Courts Mandate Coverage Despite
Insurance Industry Opposition, 9 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 4, 23, 38 (1997) (stating that because abatement
costs are covered by insurance in the context of environmental contamination claims, "[b]y analogy,
lead-based paint abatement costs are also covered.").
16. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLET-r LLP 2007, supra note 7, at 4-5.
17. See id. at 4 ("[M]ultiple courts have addressed these complex coverage issues in the context of
environmental and asbestos contamination.").
is. See Smith, supra note 2, at 121 ("Unlike asbestos cases, where electron microscopy or other
scientific analysis of asbestos-containing material samples is often used to identify the material's
manufacturer, at present there is no comparable scientific method by which the manufacturer of lead
paint can be ascertained.").
19. See William H. Pryor, Jr. et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Submitted to
Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, 27 CUMB. L. REV. j-7, 631 (1997) ("The sale of
tobacco is so unlike the categories of public nuisance well-establisheu ,i case law-such as noxious
odors, loud noise, and other types of unpleasant and inappropriate uses of property-that we do not
see how tobacco sales can be argued to fall within the definition of public nuisance.").
20. See Amber E. Dean, Lead Paint Public Entity Lawsuits: Has the Broad Stroke of Tobacco and
Firearms Litigation Painted a Troubling Picture for Lead Paint Manufacturers?, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 915,
916 (2OOl) (stating that individual states used a product liability theory to sue tobacco manufacturers).
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of public nuisance. In litigation against firearm manufacturers, though
public nuisance has been (and still is) the predominant theory,
2' there
have not been any monumental decisions to use as precedent for how
costs of abatement should be classified within the terms of a CGL
policy." Finally, though there has been much litigation in the realm of
environmental contamination, most of the cases arise under specific
environmental protection statutes or ordinances rather than under a
public nuisance theory, 3 and treatment of insurance coverage of
abatement costs has been mixed.24 Therefore, a determination as to
whether or not an insurer will be obligated to cover the costs of lead
paint abatement cannot wholly rely on any of these other areas of
litigation.
Part I of this Note will define "public nuisance" and explain the
history, legal context, as well as several past and pending cases using the
public nuisance theory in the lead paint context. Part II will analogize
and distinguish the recent lead paint litigation with already litigated cases
that considered asbestos, tobacco, firearms, and environmental
contamination. Finally, Part III of this Note will consider whether courts
should decide in favor of treating costs of abatement as "damages" for
purposes of CGL policies.
I. HISTORY AND CONTEXT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE
A. WHAT IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE?
The Second Restatement of Torts states:
(i) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.
21. See id. at 929 ("[G]overnments have alleged that the handgun industry has created a public
nuisance by failing to design all guns with sophisticated safety mechanisms.").
22. See id. ("The firearms industry suits have had some success, but clearly have not been
landslide victories reminiscent of the tobacco wars.").
23. See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1987) (seeking
reimbursement from insurer for environmental cleanup costs required under Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA")); United States v. Price, 688
F.2d 204, 207-08 (3d Cir. 1982) (seeking preliminary equitable relief under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act ("RCRA") and Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") in the form of funding to
perform diagnostic studies and to provide an alternate water supply); Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz
Underwriters Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 455, 456 (S.C. 2004) (seeking reimbursement from its insurer for
costs required to clean up pesticide-contaminated soil).
24. See, e.g., Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Today, a majority of
courts have abandoned the technical legal/equitable distinction between types of damages altogether
and have found that 'damages' may include 'response costs' 'cleanup costs' and costs of remediation
under CERCLA. "); Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988)
("[Tihe term 'damages' could reasonably include all monetary claims, whether such claims are
described as damages, expenses, costs, or losses. In the insurance context, however, the term 'damages'
is not ambiguous, and the plain meaning of the term 'damages' as used in the insurance context refers
to legal damages and does not include equitable monetary relief.").
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(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with
a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with
the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public
comfort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.25
The essence of the public nuisance tort "is to allow governments to
use the tort system to stop quasi-criminal conduct that, while not illegal,
is unreasonable given the circumstances and could cause injury to
someone exercising a common, societal right. 26 But while the tort is
typically used to prevent acts such as "dumping sewage into a public river
or blasting a stereo when people are picnicking in a public park,"27 it has
more recently been used by governments as an innovative liability theory
for "mass tort litigation" against tobacco, firearm, and lead paint28
manufacturers - contexts that arguably fit more appropriately under a
product liability theory.
The government may use a public nuisance claim to "seek an
injunction to stop the activity causing the public nuisance or force the
party to abate the public nuisance itself," remedies that are both
equitable in nature." In other words, "the government may only seek
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82IB (1979).
26. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational
Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541,541 (2oo6).
27. Id. at 541-42.
28. See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 TEMP.
L. REV. 825, 870 (2004).
29. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 26 ("They are attempting to move public nuisance
theory far outside its traditional boundaries by using it to sue product manufacturers in an effort to
circumvent the well-defined structure of products liability law."). There has been much recent
discussion with respect to the appropriateness of using public nuisance as a way to "circumvent the
well-defined structure of products liability law," and whether or not this "'new' public nuisance tort
has resulted from a sufficiently principled and intellectually rigorous common law development of
torts theory." Id.; Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L.
REV. 741, 746 (2003). However, considering the decision in Lead Industries Ass'n, and the reliable
assumption that the decision will not be overturned, it is apposite that there be more discussion
addressing the ramifications flowing from the use of public nuisance as a theory for mass products
liability, however controversial such use of the "new" public nuisance may be. Karen Ertel, Rhode
Island Lead Paint Victory May Be First of Many, Lawyers Say, TRIAL, May 2oo6, at 82-83 ("Jorge
Elorza, a law professor at Roger Williams University in Bristol, Rhode Island, said unless there is a
critical piece of evidence that was incorrectly admitted or excluded in the case, the ruling is likely to be
upheld."). Consequently, the purpose of this Note is not to delve deeper into a discussion on the
appropriate use of public nuisance, rather it is to look at the tension such a theory will trigger between
lead paint manufacturers and their insurers.
30. Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 26, at 542.
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injunction or abatement, not monetary damages" where a public
nuisance theory is used.3 Individuals, however, "who have sustained a
particular injury, such as harm to one's personal property from the public
nuisance, can use the tort to seek compensatory damages.""
Compensatory, or monetary, damages are also the typical award when a
product liability theory is used. But when the government brings a claim
of public nuisance in a representative capacity and the defendant
manufacturer incurs "costs of abatement," the remedy classification as
either equitable or legal crosses over into a grey area. Are costs of
abatement considered part of an equitable abatement remedy, or are
they more similar to an award of monetary damages? And what if it is
true that these government plaintiffs are indeed using the public nuisance
theory solely to "circumvent the well-defined structure of products
liability law"?33 Is it reasonable that the remedy be classified as
"equitable" where a public nuisance theory is used, yet be classified as
"legal" when there is a product liability claim, knowing that in the end
the manufacturer is held liable for the same harm? Or does it even
matter which theory is used if in the end the wrongdoer is held
accountable?
To the government plaintiff and those interested in making certain
the lead paint manufacturers are held liable, it does not matter which
theory is used because, in the end, the manufacturer is held liable either
way. However, to the manufacturer and its insurer, the liability theory
may make all the difference with respect to who will ultimately bear the
costs of abatement. A CGL policy provides that the insurer will pay on
behalf of the insured "all sums that [the insured] is legally obligated to
pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage."34 It is clear
that if a defendant were ordered to carry out the actual abatement itself,
then there is no "sum[] that [the insured] is legally obligated to pay as
damages"'" and thus there is no coverage. Where a court awards
"monetary damages" because of bodily injury or property damage, the
insurer will certainly have to pay. 6 But, again, "when lead paint
abatement costs are incurred following a finding of public nuisance,"
such a circumstance does not fit squarely into either category.37
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 541.
34. PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LmGATING MASS TORT CASES § i4A:25 (2007) (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Though never explicitly stated as a reason for arguing that damages, and not abatement, is the
appropriate remedy in Lead Industries Ass'n, the defense most likely understood that a damages
classification would shift the burden of cost to insurance companies, and this may have been a
motivating factor behind the defense's position. See Position Paper on Abatement, supra note IT, at
1-17.
37. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETr LLP 2006, supra note Io, at 3.
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B. LITIGATION HISTORY: PAST AND PRESENT CASES
Lead pigment was widely used by paint manufacturers in the 1920s,
193os and early I940s.f By the mid 195Os, lead paint manufacturers had
phased out the use of lead pigment and had discontinued the
manufacture and sale of interior residential lead-based paints. 9
Communities themselves began to ban the sale of lead paint, and finally
in 1978 "the federal government banned the sale of lead-based paint for
consumer or residential purposes."'
In 1987, the first suit against former lead paint manufacturers,
Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., was filed." Because the defendant
could not identify "which, if any, of the defendants [were] the source of
the lead she ingested or when the alleged injury-causing paint may have
been applied to the walls and woodwork of her childhood home," the
plaintiff requested that the court consider market-share liability for this
particular action." The plaintiff also argued that the court should
consider a concert of action theory.43 The court ultimately rejected these
claims and affirmed the summary judgment which had been granted by
the lower court in favor of the defendant." With respect to the market-
share liability claim, the First Circuit reasoned that allowing the plaintiff
to recover damages while she was unable to specify the time of the
named defendants' negligence would endanger the policy of holding
wrongdoers liable only for harm they have caused and may
"impermissibly intermingle" tortfeasors with innocent actors.45
Since Santiago, and through 2004, there have been more than sixty
actions against lead paint manufacturers and their successors-in-
interest.46 These actions have included attempts to hold lead paint
manufacturers liable using theories such as concert of action, market-
share liability, enterprise liability, civil conspiracy, and alternative
liability.47 However, like Santiago, these attempts have been futile and
have borne fruitless results for the plaintiffs. For example, in 1993 the
Third Circuit considered certain plaintiffs' market-share liability,
alternative liability and enterprise liability claims in City of Philadelphia
38. Smith, supra note 2, at 121.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 3 F-3d 546 (ist Cir. 1993); Smith, supra note 2, at 125.
42. Santiago, 3 F.3d at 547.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 552-53; see Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186 (D. Mass. 1992)
(dismissing market share liability claims); Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 794 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass.
1992) (dismissing concert of action claims).
45. Santiago, 3 F.3 d at 551.
46. Smith, supra note 2, at 124. Any discussion on the scope of successor-in-interest liability is
beyond the scope of this Note.
47. See id. at J26-27.
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v. Lead Industries Ass'n, but ultimately "affirm[ed] the dismissal of
plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety.""' A Pennsylvania state court later
reached the same conclusion by rejecting market-share liability and
alternative liability theories.49 Under Louisiana law, the Fifth Circuit
would not adopt a market-share liability theory for reasons similar to
those in Santiago." Even in New York, where the state had adopted
market-share liability in other contexts, the court refused to apply
market-share liability to the lead paint context.52 In Wisconsin and
Maryland, litigation in similar cases rendered like results. 3 Though
market-share liability and alternative liability theories made up the bulk
of the early lead paint cases, plaintiffs also tried to reach the
manufacturers through conspiracy, fraud and misrepresentation, and
design defect, but wholly failed. 4
With a long history of failed attempts to hold lead paint
manufacturers liable, interested parties turned to an old theory and tried
to give it an innovative twist. Though it was an "unusual" theory for lead
paint litigation, the public nuisance claim has nonetheless proven to be
"an applicable theory, well recognized in the law."5 However, the first
attempts to use public nuisance in these types of cases were not
successful. For example, in City of Chicago v. American Cyanamid Co.,
the City of Chicago alleged that former lead paint manufacturers had
substantially participated in creating a public nuisance and should be
required to abate the nuisance." The court reasoned:
defendants do not have the power to abate the described nuisance as
plaintiff requests because they are not in control of the premises
containing the painted surfaces.... As a matter of basic equitable
jurisprudence, the court would not enter an order compelling
defendants to do something that they have no power to do. 7
On January 14, 2005, the appellate court upheld the lower court's
48. 994 F.2d I12, 129 (3 d Cir. 1993).
49. See Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 665 A.2d 1288, 1293 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of defendant and rejecting plaintiff's market-share liability, alternative
liability, conspiracy, and concert of action theories in lead paint personal injury case); Smith, supra
note 2, at 126.
50. See Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, io6 F.3 d 1245, 1252 (5 th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district
court's dismissal for failure to state claim because Louisiana law did not recognize the market share
liability theory as a substitute for proof of proximate causation); Smith, supra note 2, at 126.
5i. See Smith, supra note 2, at 126.
52. See Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (N.Y App. Div. 1999) (holding that
market-share theory of liability does not apply in the lead paint poisoning context).
53. Smith, supra note 2, at 126.
54. See id. at 127-28.
55. Carmel Sileo, Wisconsin Court Revives Public-Nuisance Claim in Lead Paint Case, TRIAL, Feb.
2005, at 8o-83.
56. No. 02 CH 16212, 2003 WL 23315567, at *1 (11. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2003).
57. Id. at *7.
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ruling.5 The Illinois Supreme Court denied the City's petition for leave
to appeal the decision.59
It was not until Lead Industries Ass'n that the public nuisance claim
became accepted as a valid theory in lead paint litigation." After its
original filing in 1999, the court dismissed several of the claims, includinE
product liability, equitable relief to children, and unfair trade practices,'
but allowed the claim for public nuisance, among several other claims, to
move forward.62 In October of 2002, "a trial on whether the presence of
lead paint in Rhode Island buildings is a public nuisance, ended in a
mistrial when the jurors voted 4-2 against the state, but was unable to
reach a unanimous verdict. ' '6' A second trial began on November I, 2005
to consider the public nuisance claim.64 On February 22, 2006, the jury
returned a verdict finding that the presence of lead pigments and lead
paint in buildings throughout Rhode Island constituted a public
nuisance. The court also found that the defendant manufacturers
'.caused or sub[s]tantially contributed to the creation of the public
nuisance and should be ordered to abate [it]. ' '66 The defendants appealed
and oral arguments to the Rhode Island Supreme Court were heard on
May I5, 2008.67 A decision by the Rhode Island Supreme Court is still
pending.
In addition to Rhode Island, several other states, cities and counties
have litigated or are currently litigating the same issue. States that have
already litigated the issue, such as New Jersey, have not succeeded under
the public nuisance theory.6s Those that are currently litigating the issue,
such as several counties in California, still have hope that they will see
the same result as in Rhode Island.6' There is also a case involving the
City of Milwaukee where the public nuisance theory has been accepted,
but no paint manufacturers have been held liable as of yet.7" While there
are many more governmental entities that have commenced litigation on
58. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 14o (I11. App. Ct. 2005).
59. See City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 833 N.E.2d i, I (Ill. 2005).
60. Jury Verdict Form, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 22,
2006) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
6i. State Breakdown, supra note 4 (click on Rhode Island link).
62. See Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2001 WL 345830, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Apr. 2, 2001).
63. State Breakdown, supra note 4 (click on Rhode Island link).
64. Id.
65. Jury Verdict Form, Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 22,
2006) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
66. State Breakdown, supra note 4 (click on Rhode Island link).
67. Rhode Island Supreme Court Full Argument Calendar for May 7, 2oo8 through May 15, 2oo8
at 7, http://www.chiefjusticewilliams.org/supreme/pdf-files/calendar-5-o8.pdf (last visited June 1, 2oo8).
68. State Breakdown, supra note 4 (click on New Jersey link).
69. Id. (click on California link).
70. Id. (click on Wisconsin link).
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the issue, a brief overview of the litigation in New Jersey, California and
Milwaukee will demonstrate the divergent ways in which the lead
paint/public nuisance cases are currently being resolved.
i. New Jersey
In 2002, twenty-six New Jersey towns and municipalities "brought
suit against manufacturers, sellers, and promoters of lead pigment
seeking to recover costs for detecting and removing lead paint, providing
medical care to lead-poisoned residents and for developing educational
programs."'" Public nuisance was one of the many claims brought by the
government entities." The defendants motioned to dismiss the case and
the motion was granted,73 but was subsequently reversed on appeal as to
the public nuisance claim, allowing the case to move forward on a theory
of public nuisance.74 In June 2007, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the appellate court's decision holding that the lead paint based
claims were inconsistent "with the well-recognized parameters" of the
tort of public nuisance.75
While the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately rejected the public
nuisance claim, the appellate court entertained some discussion on what
is abatement and what are damages where costs of abatement are
involved. The court stated:
The [New Jersey] Lead Paint Statute imposes a duty of abatement on
property owners, while this civil action demands that the named paint-
industry defendants compensate the cities for their expenditures
caused by defendants' creation of a public nuisance.... The relief
demanded in the complaint[-]funding future programs and
compensating the municipalities for their abatement and health-care
expenses[-]would not interfere with the municipalities' ongoing
enforcement efforts under the Lead Paint Statute ... [T]he two classes
of remedies are complementary, not conflicting or duplicative.76
The very presence of lead paint[-]even lead paint that is never
ingested[-]has purportedly caused plaintiffs to incur costs of removing
lead paint and of funding detection and education programs.77
The court appears to treat the duty of abatement imposed on property
owners and the paint industry's obligation to reimburse the costs of
abating the nuisance as two separate remedies, but both as having a
71. See Sprague, supra note 3, at 643.
72. In re Lead Paint, No. MID-L-2754-oI, 2002 WL 31474528, at *I (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
Nov. 4, 2002).
73. Id.
74. In re Lead Paint Litig., No. A-1946-o2T 3 , 2005 WL 1994172, at *14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Aug. 17, 2005).
75. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484,487 (N.J. 2007).
76. In re Lead Paint Litig., 2005 WL 1994172, at *5.
77. Id. at *13.
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connection to an abatement remedy in general." The court later seems to
classify the reimbursement for abatement costs as "damages" when it
states, "[p]laintiffs also allege damages to themselves from... 'the costs
of discovering and abating Lead... and the costs of education programs
for residents of the City. .. .""' Considering these two statements
together, the court apparently considers "costs of abatement" as relating
both to an abatement remedy and a legal remedy of damages. Again,
even though the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
public nuisance claim, this particular discussion serves as an example of
the issue insurers and lead paint manufacturers will have to sort out if the
public nuisance claim becomes lucrative for government plaintiffs in
other jurisdictions.
2. California
On March 3, 2006, approximately one week after Lead Industries
Ass'n came down in Rhode Island, the California Court of Appeal
reversed a lower court judgment, reinstating a demurred public nuisance
claim8" In this case, "[a] group of governmental entities acting for
themselves, as class representatives, and on behalf of the People of the
State of California, filed a class action against a group of lead
manufacturers."8' One of the many claims in the case is that the
defendants "should be required to abate the public nuisance created by
lead paint. '' 8' As in Rhode Island, the "remedy sought [in this case] is
abatement 'from all public and private homes and property so affected
throughout the State of California.,83
The defendants have argued that abatement is the only remedy
available for public nuisance, and that since abatement is not within their
control a public nuisance theory should not succeed." The court
addressed the nature of the abatement remedy in the context of
defendants' above argument, stating:
"[A]lthough California's general nuisance statute expressly permits the
recovery of damages in a public nuisance action brought by a specially
injured party, it does not grant a damage remedy in actions brought on
behalf of the People to abate a public nuisance." The plaintiffs in a
representative public nuisance action may not avoid this rule by
seeking damages in the form of the "costs of abatement." 8'
78. Id. at *5.
79. Id. at *13.
8o. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 319-20 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
81. Id. at 319.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 324.
84. Id. at 330.
85. Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
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The court sheds some light on the tug of war between the "legal" and
"equitable" classification of costs of abatement where a government
entity sues in a representative capacity. The court favors the equitable
classification -associating costs of abatement more with the act of
abatement than with money damages-given that government plaintiffs
in a representative capacity may not avoid the general rule of the court
issuing an abatement remedy for a public nuisance "by seeking damages
in the form of the 'costs of abatement."'8 6 The court further specifies that
where a plaintiff seeks damages on his own behalf, the proper method
for seeking relief is through a product liability claim, not a public
nuisance claim."s This case has not yet reached a final outcome.
3. Wisconsin
Similar to the New Jersey case, "[t]he City of Milwaukee appeal[ed]
from a judgment and an order dismissing its complaint" against two lead
paint manufacturers to recover costs of abating lead paint hazards."
Among the claims was public nuisance, "alleging that the defendants
were 'a substantial factor in contributing to the community-wide, lead-
based public nuisance in Milwaukee.""'8 The city was seeking to recover
costs it incurred after "[a] 1998 study found that one in five children in
Milwaukee suffered from lead paint poisoning[ and] in response, the city
launched a lead-abatement program in all the affected homes."' The
City of Milwaukee "ask[ed] the paint manufacturers to pay $85 million
for the citywide cleanup."'" After the court severed the claims against the
two defendant paint manufacturers (Mautz and NL Industries) and the
trial proceeded in 2007, a Milwaukee jury found that "lead paint in city
buildings was a public nuisance, but that NL Industries did not
intentionally engage in conduct that caused it."9
II. COSTS OF ABATEMENT IN SIMILAR CONTEXTS
Because there is no current authority to definitively provide an
answer as to whether or not costs of abating a public nuisance in the lead
paint context are an "equitable" or a "legal" remedy, perhaps the best
way to predict and/or propose the correct outcome would be to look at
how similar litigation in other contexts has handled the issue.
Unfortunately, these other contexts -asbestos, tobacco, environmental
86. Id.
87. Id. at33I.
88. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888,89o (Wis. Ct. App. 2004).
89. Sprague, supra note 3, at 645 (quoting NL Indus., 691 N.W.2d at 893).
90. Sileo, supra note 55, at 8o.
91. Id.
92. Rita Ann Cicero, Milwaukee Jury Finds for Lead-Paint Maker, 25 Toxic TORTS LrrlG. REP. 13




contamination and firearms-do not offer perfect assistance. They do,
however, provide authority as to how to treat costs of abatement as a
remedy for public nuisance.
A. ASBESTOS
Asbestos actions typically arise under a products liability theory, and
more specifically have arisen in two different situations:
(i) ... against suppliers of raw asbestos fiber, wherein employees of
manufacturers of asbestos products actually or allegedly had
contracted asbestos-related diseases as a result of exposure... and
(2) ... against manufacturers of products.., where insulators and
other asbestos workers allegedly or actually had contracted asbestos-
related diseases as a result of exposure ....
Because it is relatively easy to identify the manufacturer of the
asbestos-containing material, asbestos plaintiffs generally rely on a
theory of product liability and avoid "resort[ing] to theories of liability
not requiring product identification evidence," such as public nuisance. 9
Specifically, most asbestos cases attempt to show that a specific
manufacturer's asbestos-containing material caused "bodily injury"'9 and
that damages should compensate for such bodily injury (falling within a
CGL policy's coverage of "all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury")." Thus,
because a plaintiff in asbestos product liability cases can identify a
specific manufacturer, show that asbestos caused bodily injury, and be
directly compensated through monetary damages, the asbestos context
renders no comparable solution as to how costs of abatement should be
treated in a public nuisance context.
B. TOBACCO
Similar to asbestos litigation, there has never been a hopeful
prospect of successful tobacco litigation based on a public nuisance
theory,97 but states and individuals have been successful in bringing suit
93. William B. Johnson, Annotation, Products Liability: Inhalation of Asbestos, 39 A.L.R.4TH 399,
§ 2(a) (1985).
94. Smith, supra note 2, at 121.
95. See TOD ZUCKERMAN & MARK RASKOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LITIGATION: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 27:13 (2002) ("[T]here have been more asbestos bodily injury claims than asbestos property
damage claims. For this reason, there have also been many more asbestos bodily injury coverage
disputes (and coverage cases) than asbestos property damage coverage disputes (and case
decisions).").
96. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 2006, supra note to, at 5-6.
97. See Pryor et al., supra note 19, at 631 ("The sale of tobacco is so unlike the categories of
public nuisance well-established in case law-such as noxious odors, loud noise, and other types of
unpleasant and inappropriate uses of property-that we do not see how tobacco sales can be argued to
fall within the definition of public nuisance.").
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against tobacco companies using a product liability theory.
9 However,
this is not to say that states have never attempted to use a theory of
public nuisance against tobacco manufacturers. In fact, plaintiff states
have brought cases against the tobacco companies under a theory of
public nuisance in an attempt "to avoid many of the defenses available to
tobacco companies against more traditional product tort claims filed by
individual victims of tobacco-related illness, such as defenses based on
the smoker's own conduct and statutes of limitations."' But these public
nuisance claims by plaintiff states never ran their full course because
"[t]he states' lawsuits against the tobacco companies were settled before
courts could address the viability of public nuisance claims in the context
of mass products. . ."" Thus, as with the asbestos cases, tobacco
litigation also fails to address how costs of abatement should be classified
under a theory of public nuisance because the public nuisance claims
never reached judicial analysis. Nonetheless, the settlements made in the
tobacco cases have largely "inspired states and municipalities and their
attorneys to file similar claims against the manufacturers of handguns
and lead-pigment. ....
C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
Environmental contamination cases are similar to lead paint cases in
that in both contexts there is a toxic substance that is ordered to be
abated, removed, or cleaned up. In many instances, where the cleanup
has already occurred, costs of abatement are awarded.' °2 However, there
98. See Dean, supra note 20, at 916.
99. Gifford, supra note 29, at 747.
ioo. Id.
iOI. Id.
102. See, e.g., Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2005) (seeking declaratory
judgment that insurer was not obliged to reimburse insured for environmental remediation costs);
Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 1i8 F.3d 1263 (8th Cir. 1997) (seeking an order for
insurer to continue payments where insurer stopped making payments for the cost of cleaning up
contaminants improperly disposed of by the insured); SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co.,
113 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 1997) (seeking reimbursement from the excess insurer where insured spilled a
toxic chemical and subsequently cleaned it under direction of environmental authorities); Cont'l Ins.
Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1988) (seeking reimbursement for costs of
abatement that was required due to improper disposal of toxic chemicals); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348 (4th Cir. 1987) (seeking reimbursement of costs from its insurer for
environmental cleanup costs plaintiff was required to pay under CERCLA); Mraz v. Canadian
Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1986) (seeking payment from insurer for the cost of
cleaning up environmental damage to a disposal site); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.
1982) (requesting preliminary equitable relief through funding to perform diagnostic studies and to
provide an alternate water supply where a landfill owner did not properly dispose of toxic chemicals,
thereby contaminating the city's water supply); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Super.
Ct., 16 P.3d 94 (Cal. 2001) (asserting that insurers must indemnify the insured under a CGL policy for
costs expended in complying with CERCLA); AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 19o)
(seeking declaratory relief that insurer must reimburse the costs of a cleanup pursuant to CERCLA);
Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 455 (S.C. 2004) (seeking
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are legal issues that distinguish environmental cases from the recent lead
paint cases. First, "[i]n environmental cases, abatement orders are often
precipitated by damage that is traceable back to a particular defendant
whose conduct had an effect on specific property. ' "'" As a result, in the
environmental case:
[tihe legal analysis regarding the nature of damages was done in the
context of quantifiable, traceable damage. Conversely, the public
nuisance theory in the lead paint case premises liability on the sole fact
that a company was one of many that manufactured a particular
product that may have possibly or may not have ended up in any
number of homes in the jurisdiction."4
Second, the cases arising in the environmental contamination context are
almost always brought under a specific environmental protection statute
or ordinance as opposed to a theory of public nuisance." For these
reasons, it is difficult to find solid authority for how to treat costs of
abatement in the lead paint context by analogy to environmental
contamination cases.
Notwithstanding these two differences, it would nonetheless be
difficult to find undisputed authority from environmental cases regarding
how to classify costs of abatement in the insurance context due to the
courts' inconsistent treatment of the issue."6 In earlier environmental
cleanup cases, courts tended to favor treating cleanup costs, or costs of
abatement, as not falling within the meaning of the term "damages" in a
CGL policy. For example, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc.,
where Armco was seeking reimbursement from its insurer for cleanup
costs expended to remedy a hazardous waste site, the court explained
that a "general comprehensive liability policy between the parties covers
'damages,' but not the expenditures which result from complying with
the directives of regulatory agencies""'7 In this, and other cases, the
reimbursement from insurer for costs expended when plaintiff was required to clean up pesticide-
contaminated soil).
103. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETr LLP 2oo6, supra note Io, at 6.
For example, in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, the insureds allowed
rain water mixed with radioactive waste to contaminate the soil of a site, causing
measurable increases of radiation in the soil on and near the premises. Similarly, in Helena
Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., the insureds released chemicals into the soil in
close proximity to their operations.
Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 6-7.
lO5. See cases cited supra note 23.
lo6. See cases cited supra note 24.
107. 822 F.2d at 1352. For more examples of earlier environmental cleanup cases where the court
did not equate the environmental cleanup costs as triggering coverage in a CGL policy, see Cont'l Ins.
Cos., 842 F.2d at 985, stating "[i]n the insurance context.., the term 'damages' is not ambiguous, and
the plain meaning of the term 'damages' as used in the insurance context refers to legal damages and
does not include equitable monetary relief"; Mraz, 804 F.2d at 1329, holding that "response costs" to
remedy environmental damage are independent of, and cannot be equated with "property damage"
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courts favored the insurer by drawing a line between actual monetary
damages and money paid pursuant to an equitable remedy.
However, more recent environmental cleanup cases, such as
International Insurance Co. v. RSR Corp., have taken an opposing
position."' In International Insurance Co., a commercial liability insurer
was seeking declaratory judgment that the insurer was not obliged to
reimburse the insured company for environmental remediation costs
imposed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) after lead
pollution had been discovered at a smelting site. °9 In addressing whether
or not the insurer would have to reimburse the costs of remediation, the
court stated, "[tioday, a majority of courts have abandoned the technical
legal/equitable distinction between types of damages altogether and have
found that 'damages' may include 'response costs' 'cleanup costs' and
costs of remediation under CERCLA ..... Other courts, in more recent
decisions, have similarly held in favor of the insured, deciding that
insurers are obligated to reimburse or repay environmental remediation
costs expended by the insured."'
While the more recent trend in environmental remediation cases is
to hold in favor of the insured rather than the insurer, and to order
reimbursement of cleanup costs under CGL policies, the fact that there
were many cases decided only a decade earlier that held the opposite
shows that there is at least some ddgree of uncertainty in this area of the
law. Additionally, the legal theories used in nearly all environmental
cases do not include public nuisance. There is, therefore, a foundation to
conclude that because the recent majority of environmental cleanup
cases have held in favor of the insured,"2 the same reasoning should be
extended to the lead paint context. But knowing that past cases have
held the other way, that public nuisance is not generally used as a theory
under a general liability insurance contract and, thus, such remedial response costs are not covered in
the insurance policy; and Price, 688 F.2d at 212, holding that a request for funds for abatement of the
contaminated water supply "is not, in any sense, a traditional form of damages."
lo8. 426 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2oo5).
lO9. Id. at 284-85.
Iio. Id. at 288.
Ix. See Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., it8 F.3d 1263, 1271 (8th Cir. 1997)
("[W]e interpret the term 'as damages' to include both legal damages and equitable relief because that
interpretation favors the insured."); SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 113 F.3d 536, 539
(5th Cir. 1997) ("Environmental cleanup costs, whether incurred by the federal government under
CERCLA or by an individual who voluntarily undertakes the task of cleaning up hazardous waste, are
damages [and thus are covered by the language of a CGL policy]."); AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 799
P.2d 1253, 1269 (Cal. 199o) ("To the extent that policy language is ambiguous in light of the way
environmental statutes authorize relief, our goal remains to protect the objectively reasonable
expectations of the insured."); Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 594 S.E.2d 455, 459
(S.C. 2004) ("[T]here is a split of authority over whether environmental cleanup costs constitute
'damages' under an insurance policy. The majority of state courts have held that there is coverage for
these costs.").
112. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETr LLP 2007, supra note 7, at 4-5.
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in environmental cases, and that (as demonstrated in Part III) there are
recent cases in other contexts that treat costs of abatement as not being
"damages," there is uncertainty as to the propriety of extending the
holdings in environmental cleanup cases to the lead paint context.
D. FIREARMS
Though public nuisance is a primary theory used in suits against
handgun manufacturers, plaintiffs have met limited success in their
efforts to hold handgun manufacturers liable for damages under the
theory."' Some plaintiffs have convinced the courts to allow their cases to
move forward under a public nuisance theory in the handgun context,"4
but there has not been a monumentally successful case to use as
precedent as to how costs of abatement should be classified in terms of
coverage under a CGL policy."5 One of the reasons there has been such
limited success in this context is that "[p]roduct manufacturers contend
that introducing public nuisance into this area would only lead to
instability because existing products liability doctrines already govern the
production and marketing of products. Accordingly, they have urged
courts to refrain from expanding the concept of public nuisance beyond
its traditional boundaries."" 6 For example, in 2001, the Third Circuit, in a
case against handgun manufacturers, stated:
Whatever the precise scope of public nuisance law in New Jersey may
be, no New Jersey court has ever allowed a public nuisance claim to
proceed against manufacturers for lawful products that are lawfully
placed in the stream of commerce. On the contrary, the courts have
enforced the boundary between the well-developed body of product
liability law and public nuisance law. Otherwise, if public nuisance law
were permitted to encompass product liability, nuisance law "would
become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of
tort.""..7
Without a "landslide" case against handgun manufacturers under a
theory of public nuisance," 8 where abatement or costs of abatement are
involved, handgun litigation does not offer much help in determining
how to treat costs of abatement in the lead paint context.
113. See Ausness, supra note 28, at 871-73.
114. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (stating
plaintiff's nuisance claim survives the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim); Cincinnati v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143-44 (Ohio 2002) (stating appellant adequately stated its public
nuisance claim so as to overcome the appellee's motion to dismiss the claim).
885. See Dean, supra note 20, at 489.
i6. Ausness, supra note 28, at 871.
I 7. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3d
Cir. 2ooi) (quoting Tioga Public Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993)).
I I8. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 2006, supra note io, at 4-5.
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III. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE COSTS OF ABATEMENT?
Without clear precedent from any other context,"9 courts will have
to decide who will bear the cost of abating a lead paint public nuisance.
With an understanding of mass litigation in other similar contexts and an
understanding of the tort of public nuisance, it seems that the "best" or
the "most justifiable" outcome would be to hold lead paint
manufacturers, and not their insurers, responsible for the costs of
abatement.
However, courts may ultimately resolve the issue in the alternative.
There is a long history and a strong policy of interpreting policy language
against insurers if the policy is found to be "ambiguous ..... Thus, if a
court determines there is ambiguity in what is meant by the term
"damages," insurers may have to overcome the court's inclination to
interpret in favor of the insured. Also, the proposition that the insured,
and not the insurer, should bear the costs of abatement has been
opposed by commentators. Specifically, Miller's 1997 Environmental
Claims Journal article suggested that costs of abating lead paint hazards
are covered under CGL policies. 2 '
In the context of environmental contamination, courts have long since
held that costs expended to mitigate future environmental damage are
covered absent a formal legal action against a policyholder.
By analogy, lead-based paint abatement costs are also covered
because, in most cases, abatement of the lead-based paint hazard is
undertaken to mitigate future bodily injury.' 0
It is possible that courts considering the issue will accept this analogy and
draw the same conclusion.
Yet, while courts often interpret policies to favor the insured, and
courts may agree with commentators that costs of abatement should be
covered by CGL policies, as was mentioned at the outset of this Section,
it is not clear that courts should reach this result. First, a rule that says
where there is ambiguity courts will interpret in favor of the insured
presupposes that there is indeed ambiguity in the insurance contract.
However, before applying the rule of construction regarding ambiguity,
courts must first apply other rules and make every effort to determine
the true meaning of a contract in an attempt to avoid the rule for
ambiguity in the first place.'23 Second, there have been several new
developments in the lead paint context that did not exist at the time of
Miller's 1997 article. While it is true that, as the article states,
119. See supra Part II.
120. ALLAN D. WINDT, I INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES 4TH § 6:2 (2007).
121. See Miller, supra note 15, at 38.
122. Id.
123. See WINDT, supra note 120.
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environmental damage abatement costs have been covered under CGL
policies,'24 the article does not consider what effect the recent acceptance
of public nuisance as a valid theory in the lead paint context might have
on the analogy; the theory succeeded for the first time in 2006, nine years
after the article was written. Thus, any analogy drawn between the lead
paint and environmental contaminatlion contexts that suggests costs of
abatement are covered under a CGL policy must consider any impact the
recent acceptance of the nuisance theory might have on the comparison.
Additionally, the article overlooks the fact that many cases in the past
have come down in favor of the insurer where costs of abatement are
involved.' 5
The Rhode Island court, in Lead Industries Ass'n, may one day have
the opportunity to consider these arguments in an attempt to resolve the
issue. It is particularly interesting to note that the defense in the Rhode
Island case has raised an argument that, were it accepted by the court,
would seemingly resolve the issue in favor of the insured. In its attempt
to show that abatement is not an appropriate remedy for the case, the
defense simply argues that where there is payment of money, the remedy
is legal, not equitable."' Specifically, the defense states, "[an 'injunction'
that seeks to compel the payment of money is properly characterized
only as legal, not equitable, relief.''2 7 The defense further states,
"[d]espite the State's tactical decision to characterize its funding request
for lead-related programs as something other than a remedy at law, the
relief is not equitable. For this reason, the State's demand for abatement
or abatement funds cannot be awarded in equity...... If this is true, and
the remedy is legal, coverage under a CGL policy would be triggered
since the money paid would then be classified as "damages."
But there are also strong arguments in opposition to the defense's
suggestion that would result in treating costs of abatement as
"equitable," rather than "legal." First, abatement, and not damages, is
the appropriate remedy for a claim of public nuisance in general.' 9 As
stated in Part I of this Note, government entities may use a public
nuisance theory to "seek an injunction to stop the activity causing the
public nuisance or force the party to abate the public nuisance itself."'30
Both of theses remedies are equitable in nature, neither having any
association with a legal remedy. While private individuals "can use [a
124. See supra Part ILC.
125. See cases cited supra note 107.
126. See Position Paper on Abatement, supra note II, at 5-6.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 7.
129. See Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 26, at 542.
130. Id.
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public nuisance claim] to seek compensatory damages, ''3. a government
plaintiff can only seek an equitable remedy, such as abatement. 132 Thus,
the actual costs associated with an equitable remedy, under a theory that
may offer only an equitable remedy, should be equitable in nature as
well. To say that a legal remedy should stem from a claim that, when
invoked by a government entity can offer only equitable recourse,
muddles the bounds of public nuisance. To maintain a separate identity
for government claims of public nuisance, the remedy should not be
equated with "damages," a legal remedy.
Second, though no cases give direct authority as to how to treat costs
of abatement in the lead paint context, at least one recent case in the
handgun context has sided with the interpretation that costs of abating a
public nuisance are equitable, and thus do not trigger coverage by the
insurer. In Ellett Bros. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. an insured
handgun manufacturer sought declaratory judgment against its insurers
under CGL policies, alleging that the insurer was obligated to indemnify
the insured for costs of abating the public and private nuisances created
by the manufacturer's marketing of handguns, among other complaints.'33
In an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit had held that "damages" in an
insurance contract means legal damages only and do not extend to
equitable relief.'34 Assuming costs of abatement to be "equitable" in
nature, the court decided that since "damages" are a purely legal
remedy, interpretation of the CGL policy should not necessarily be
construed in favor of the insured.' Ultimately, the court concluded that
none of the complaints in Ellett Bros. sought "damages," or
compensation for past injuries."6 Though "money" was sought in part as
a reimbursement for costs of abatement, the court held that none of this
"money" constituted "damages."'37 Thus, the insured's CGL policy
coverage was not triggered, and the insurer was not liable to pay any
costs of abatement. Ellett Bros. is a good example of a recent case that
has considered how costs of abatement in public nuisance should be
classified, and such an interpretation could easily extend to the recent
lead paint cases.
Additionally, particular language used in one of the pending lead
paint cases also gives some clarity to the proper classification of costs of
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 275 F.3 d 384,386-87 (4th Cir. 2001).
134- Id. at 387 (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Milliken & Co., 875 F.2d 979,981 (4th Cir. 1988)).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 386-87. But see id. at 390 (Michael, J., concurring in part and concurring in the




abatement. In County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court
stated that a damage remedy may not be sought in a representative
capacity where a public nuisance is involved.13 This statement,
specifically applied to the lead paint/public nuisance context, favors
treating costs of abatement as "equitable" since damages are not allowed
under a public nuisance theory. The court also called attention to
another California case that gave even more clarity to the proper
classification of costs of abatement. I39 In City of San Diego v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., the City of San Diego brought an action against
manufacturers of asbestos-containing building materials, seeking to
recover damages for money it had spent and would spend to identify and
abate asbestos danger and for loss of use and declining value of its
property." However, in disallowing the city to bring an action under
public nuisance (because the city brought the action on its own behalf for
a "defective product," not in a representative capacity), the court noted
that in all other asbestos-related "product liability" cases, no party could
recover damages for the defective product under a theory of nuisance.
This further supports the notion that damages are not recoverable under
a theory of nuisance brought in a representative capacity, and therefore
the costs of abatement associated with a public nuisance should fall
within the equitable remedy of abatement.
It is unclear whether courts will ultimately decide to interpret CGL
policies in favor of the insured by analogizing to the more recent
environmental cleanup cases, or whether they will decide to equate only
equitable remedies with government public nuisance claims, and look to
cases such as Ellett Bros. to find in favor of the insurers. But if the courts
do decide to favor the insured, at the very least they should consider the
impact of "expansive" policy interpretations on insurers.' Specifically,
where insurers expect the limits of their policies to be clear and fixed and
then judicial interpretation expands policy coverage beyond what the
insurers had expected, it "undermines insurers' actuarial calculations"
and "destabilizes the insuring function."'43 While noting the issue is
sharply divided as to whether "damages" do or do not include costs of
abatement in the insurance context,'" one court, in reference to the idea
that the defining damages in a CGL policy should be narrowly construed,
stated:
138. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 329 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006); see supra Part I.B.2.
139. Id. at 325-29.
140. 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 878 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
141. Id. at 883 (citing several California cases that reject the idea of allowing recovery of damages
under a theory of nuisance).
142. See generally Abraham, supra note 9.
143. Id. at 960.
144. Cont'l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977,985 (8th Cir. 1988).
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The expansive reading of the term "damages" urged by the state would
render the term "all sums" virtually meaningless. "If the term
'damages' is given the broad, boundless connotations sought by the
[insured], then the term 'damages' in the contract... would become
mere surplusage, because any obligation to pay would be covered. The
limitation implied by employment of the phrase 'to pay as damages'
would be obliterated.' 45
No matter how courts decide to handle the issue, there will be
justification for their decision either way. With a recent trend of finding
in favor of the insured in the environmental cleanup context and with a
policy to interpret in favor of the insured where there is ambiguity, it is
very possible the courts will hold insurers responsible for the costs of
abatement. But whether or not courts should decide that a legal remedy
is available under a theory that generally offers only equitable remedies
is a different question. Perhaps the answer to the question of how the
issue should be resolved can be found in a simple statement from Rhode
Island Attorney General Patrick Lynch when, referring to Lead
Industries Ass'n, he said the "suit has always been about abatement," '46
rather than damages. Thus, in a suit under a theory of public nuisance,
where the remedy sought is abatement, it seems that it would be most
appropriate to classify the remedy as "equitable" regardless of whether
the remedy is the actual abatement itself, or the costs of abating the
nuisance in the alternative.
CONCLUSION
Will insurers bear the cost of abating the latest public nuisance? The
answer remains unanswered by case law. There has yet to be a strong
authoritative answer regarding how to treat abatement costs where a
theory of public nuisance is used in lead paint litigation. Costs of
abatement are not new to the field of insurance and have been an issue in
environmental contamination and handgun manufacturing in the past.
Similar mass tort litigation has run its course in the contexts of asbestos
and tobacco. In most of these contexts, the theory of public nuisance has
found its way into court discussion. Yet the recent lead paint litigation
opens a new chapter, and will ultimately merit new answers to these old
questions placed in this new context.
While courts will be justified either way in deciding that costs of
abatement are or are not covered by CGL policies in the lead paint
context, perhaps the best answer is that costs of abatement should not
trigger insurance coverage under a CGL policy. A theory of public
nuisance has, in the past, offered as its principal remedy "abatement,"
145. Id. at 986 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir. 1987)).
146. Ertel, supra note 29, at 82.
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and the costs of carrying out the abatement should not be treated any
differently than the equitable remedy itself.
POSTSCRIPT
This note was submitted for publication prior to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court's decision in Rhode Island v. Lead Industries Ass'n.'47 On
July I, 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the lower court, dismissing the case because the state had failed to allege
the necessary facts to support its public nuisance claim.'48 With this
decision, the answer to the question of who should bear the cost of
abating a lead paint public nuisance remains unanswered for a while
longer, and perhaps for good if the remaining states still actively
litigating the issue follow the same path that Rhode Island has taken.
While the question may still be answered in the near future, for now the
issue remains unresolved.
147. Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. 99-5226, 2008 WL 2605396 (R.I. July i, 2008).
148. id. at *2.
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